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The U.S.  Department  of Agriculture's  (USDA)  calculations  of producer  and consumer
equivalents,  termed  PSE's  and  CSE's consist  of two  components.2  Indirect  and  direct  budget
transfers  to  farmers,  or  what might  be  called  the  budgeted  subsidy  effect  are the  first kind  of
components.  Indirect  means  of raising  farm incomes  through  border  measures,  which  put  a
price  wedge  between  domestic  and  world  prices,  are  the second  kind.  Calculated  this  way,  the
absolute  value  of these  transfers  to  farmers  approximates  producer  surplus  without  the
deadweight  welfare  triangle.  The  CSE  approximates  consumer surplus.
One  suggestion  for  possible  strategies  in the  current round  of General  Agreement  on  Tariffs
and  Trade (GATT)  talks  is  to  negotiate  a reduction  in PSE's  and  CSE's,  among  all  participants.
Before  such  a strategy  is  adopted,  negotiators  need  to  be  aware  of potential  limitations  of  the
statistics  that could  prevent  their use.  This chapter  reviews  some  of those  limitations,
focusing  on PSE's.
There  are  some general  limitations  for which it is  difficult  to  correct  but which  are  not
sufficiently  large  to  prevent  the  PSE's  from being  used  as  negotiating  tools.  First,  the
policies  of certain  countries  have  a spillover  effect  on other  countries.  Perhaps  the  most
obvious  example  of this effect  is  the U.S.  loan  rate.  The  loan  rate  represents  a floor price  to
the rest  of the world,  and,  therefore,  effectively  subsidizes  foreign  production.  The effect  is
magnified,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  past 5  years,  when  the U.S.  dollar  is  overvalued
internationally.  Foreign  expansion  is less  risky but  more  profitable  provided  that  the  loan
rate  is higher  than  the  free-market  world  price (the  price that  would  prevail in  the  absence
of the  loan rate).  In  a broader  sense,  the  measures  fail  to  take into  account  any
large-country  price  effects  on  the  world  reference  price.  All countries  are  assumed  to  be
price  takers.  Therefore,  changes  in border  prices  or  budgetary  expenditures  are  assumed  to
have  no effect  on  the world  reference  price.  In  reality,  however,  a  major  policy  change  in a
large  country  will  probably  affect  the world  price.
Second,  the  PSE's and  CSE's  have to  be  measured  in  a  common currency  to  measure  the
wedge  between  domestic  prices  and  a world  reference  price.  For  example,  the  reference  price,
expressed  in  dollars  must  first  be  translated  into  a domestic  currency  amount.  PSE's and
CSE's  are therefore  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  value  of countries'  exchange  rates  compared
with  the  dollar.  As the  dollar  appreciates,  it  reduces  other  countries'  PSE's  and  CSE's
because  it raises  the  world  reference  price.  Countries  that  do not  change  their  domestic
programs  therefore  will  appear  to  be  subsidizing  less  if their  currencies  depreciate  against  the
dollar.  Even  when  the  measures  are  corrected  for certain  types  of exchange  rate  policies,  the
basic  problem  remains.
Third,  PSE's  and  CSE's  are subject  to  volatility  from  year  to  year  because  of changes  in
supply and  demand,  even  if a country's  policies  do  not  change.  For  example,  a  bumper  crop
in a small country  might increase  the  value  of cash  receipts  relative  to transfers.  If the
price wedge  were  small in comparison  to  budgetary  expenditures,  the PSE  would  tend  to fall.
By contrast,  a crop  shortfall  might increase  the  PSE.
1The author is  an economist,  Agriculture and Trade Analysis  Division, Economic  Research  Service,  U.S.  Department
of Agriculture, Washington,  DC.  These  comments  are a summary of a paper delivered  at the winter meetings  of the
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium held in El Batan, Mexico,  Dec.  13-18,  1986.
2 Except as  noted, my  comments  are restricted to USDA  numbers.  The  PSE's and CSE's calculated  by the USDA  are
not always  consistent  with the Organization of Economic  Cooperation and Development  (OECD)  calculations.  Nor are all
the  OECD  numbers calculated  in the same  manner.
145In sum,  the  measures  will  vary  from  year  to year  as  world  prices  fluctuate,  as  exchange  rates
change,  and  as supply  and demand  rise  and fall  about  trend.  This  volatility  suggests  that
negotiators  will  need  to agree  on  the  base  year  as  well  as  on the  measure.  Despite  these
limitations,  the  OECD countries  did  agree  on a  base  year  for their  trade  liberalization  study.
Therefore,  it  is reasonable  to expect  that these  measurement  problems,  while  serious,  are  not
insurmountable  obstacles  to  the  negotiations.
Other  problems  are  likely to  present  more difficult  obstacles  to  using  the  current  PSE  and
CSE formulations  in  the  negotiations.  First,  some  key  policies  have  escaped  inclusion  due  to
political  or measurement  problems.  Export credits,  for example,  are  excluded.  Excluding  such
programs  sends a signal  that these  are nondistorting  programs  or  that  these  kinds  of programs
will  not be subject  to  international  scrutiny  in  the trade  negotiations.  Since export  credits  do
not show  up  as  line items  in Government  budgets,  they signal  the  wave of  future  subsidies.
Countries  may infer  that any program  effectively  subsidizes  farmers  without  adding  to  the
Federal  or State  budget  (or otherwise  raising  the  PSE)  will  be  sanctioned,  regardless  of  its
trade  effects.
A minor  related  point  is  that the  measures  include  some  expenditures  such  as  research  costs,
which  should  be left out.  The largest  countries  expenditures  on research,  in fact,  have
substantial  beneficial  spillover  effects  onto other  countries.
The second  and  most serious problem  with  the  USDA  transfer  measures  is  the  weighting
system.  For example,  the  USDA  measures  as  currently  calculated,  do not  take supply
management  effects  into account.  In broader  terms,  the measures  do  not  weight  expenditures
by their trade  effects.  Specifically,  they  do  not weight  expenditures  by  how  much  the  policy
package  induces  new production,  in the  case  of PSE's,  or  shrinks  consumption,  in  the  case  of
CSE's.  Were  the current  PSE's  to  be  negotiated,  a  $10-million  cut  in  research  expenditures
for a  given country  would  have  the  same  effect on  the  value  of a  PSE  as  a  $10-million  drop
in deficiency  payments.  Trade-weighted  or  "effective"  PSE's  are  needed  if the  negotiations
are to  result in  meaningful  cuts  in  subsidy  levels. 3
If PSE's  and  CSE's are to  be  used  in negotiations,  participants  need  to  agree  on  certain
technical  issues.  They  must reach  consenus  on  which  policies  should  be  included  and,  possibly,
on  which methodology  should  be  used  to  calculate  the trade,  or  additionality  effects.  For
example,  countries  will  have  an  incentive  to  undervalue  their  own-price  supply  and  demand
elasticities,  and  to  assume  that  their  elasticities  of substitution  are infinity.
The principal  value  of PSE's  and  CSE's  is  that  they helps  identify  which  policies  are  the
major  sources  of  protection  in each  country.  They  also  determine  where  changes  ought  to  be
made.  First,  however,  an  effective  measure  or  an  alternative  negotiating  strategy  that
addresses  the  issue of  additionality  is  needed.
Even "effective" PSE's  and  CSE's  may not  be  tractable  negotiating  tools.  Can  we  assume,  for
instance,  that after  comparing  PSE's,  individual  countries  will be  willing  to  swap  changes  in
what  are essentially  domestic  policies  for changes  in another  country's  border measures?  We
are still a  long way off from anticipating  that outcome  at  the  GATT trade  negotiations.
3Although  none  of the USDA  numbers have  been  trade-adjusted, some  of the OECD  numbers have  been.  OECD
transfer measures  therefore are not  strictly comparable  across  countries.
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